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1. Introduction 
Expertise has played a pivotal role in EU executives 
since the European Union (EU) was established, but 
its significance is arguably increasing and takes on 
new shapes. This issue explores the role and use of 
expert knowledge in decision-making in and by EU 
executive institutions. Developments in the EU are 
decisive for executive organisation and politics in Eu-
rope, in particular due to the position of the European 
Commission as the EU’s executive centre, but also be-
cause of the growing number of EU-level agencies. 
What characterizes EU’s executive organizations' reli-
ance on expert advice and judgment? How is the use 
of expertise organized? And what are the implications 
of expertise organisation for experts’ performance 
and interactions, policy outcomes, institutional dy-
namics and democratic legitimacy? This introductory 
paper gives an overview of how these questions have 
been addressed in contemporary study of the Euro-
pean Union and serves as an introduction to the in-
depth analysis provided by the contributions to this 
special issue. But first, we explore the major argu-
ment as to why it is relevant to centre analytical at-
tention on the nexus between expertise and executive 
institutions in the political-administrative systems, 
and second we look at why analysis of this relation-
ship is especially warranted in the context of the EU’s 
political-administrative order. 
2. Why Executives? Why EU? Why Expertise? 
Public administration has a central role in the prepara-
tion and implementation of public policies, and in regu-
lating what kinds of actors, problems and solutions 
have access to processes of policy-making. In complex 
political-administrative orders, public administration 
has a compound role that extends across most stages 
of the policy process and the traditional division of 
powers (Vibert, 2007). Its influence lies in taking initia-
tive, shaping the policy agenda and the policy alterna-
tives, and drafting policy texts before formal decisions 
are made. Public administrative bodies also exert influ-
ence in the process of putting formal political decisions 
into practice, monitoring and interpreting the effects of 
policy and channelling feedback on how policies work 
back to the political-administrative system, and thus 
laying the foundation for new cycles of policy making. 
Moreover, as carriers of norms and values and basing 
their authority on principles of hierarchy, rule of law 
and expertise, bureaucracies have intrinsic value that 
extends beyond their instrumentality (Olsen, 2010). 
This institutional complexity is also evident in the EU. 
The overall development of the EU shows signs of an 
emerging executive system upheld by a political-
administrative order that sets it apart from traditional 
international organizations and implies a profound 
transformation of executive politics within the EU (Eg-
eberg, 2006). The European Commission (Commission) 
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harbours organised capacity for policy making at the su-
pranational level and carries most of the organizational 
and behavioural characteristics of “normal” executive 
bodies at the national level (Egeberg, 2006; Wille, 2013). 
With executive institutions at the EU level as a node, this 
executive order spans governance levels and includes 
multiple types of actors (Curtin & Egeberg, 2008). 
Research on the EU’s multi-level administrative sys-
tem relates to a wider set of issues that concerns mod-
ern political order’s reliance on expert advice and 
judgement. In constitutional democracies the “will of 
the people” does not rule unfettered by concerns for 
other core values: rule of law, the concerns of the 
“past and future” as opposed to the hegemony of the 
present, the rights of the especially affected and mi-
norities to be protected from the “tyranny of the ma-
jority”, but also values attached to professional con-
cerns and basing common decisions on specialized 
knowledge and factual evidence, to ensure their 
“truth-sensitivity”, and so the quality of policy out-
comes (Christiano, 2012; Holst & Tørnblad, 2015 (this 
issue)). The starting point for this paper then is that: 1) 
we can expect that differences in the organization of 
political-administrative institutions will affect the ways 
in which such concerns are blended, balanced, justified 
and justifiable; 2) principles of expert-based decision-
making are part of corner stone values in modern polit-
ical orders, but do not necessarily find themselves in a 
settled position within such orders.  
The role of expertise in political-administrative sys-
tems is an issue that is as perennial as it is topical, dy-
namic and seemingly paradoxical. On the one hand 
there is a demand for and expectation that policy-
making should be based on evidence and facts and in 
accordance with, or at least guided by, what experts 
have to say; there is an increased scope for the particu-
larly knowledgeable—those who know non-trivially 
more than most people within a domain, and that have 
“a capacity to deploy or exploit this fund of information 
to form beliefs in true answers to new questions that 
may be posed in the domain” (Goldman, 2011, p. 115). 
Knowledge production has during the previous decades 
grown exponentially, making the pool of specialized in-
formation potentially of relevance for policy a vast 
ocean of knowledge. “Knowledge-based democracies” 
are embedded in knowledge-based economies and so-
cieties. Different kinds of expertise are seen as essen-
tial for addressing complex problems and for managing 
high pace technological change and for regulation of 
risk prone issues and activities. The regulatory state 
has delegated powers to specialized agencies, staffed 
by purportedly neutral experts, partly based on the ar-
gument that they can carry out policies with a level of 
efficiency and effectiveness that politicians cannot 
match (Majone, 1999, p. 4). Furthermore, competent 
and professional bureaucracies are a key factor of qual-
ity of government and quality of life (Rothstein, 2012). 
In addition, a myriad of expert advice arrangements 
are established and expected to contribute to enlight-
ening and improving on the problem-solving creden-
tials of policy- and decision-making (Fischer, 2009). Cit-
izens seem moreover to accept decision-making on 
these terms as legitimate and place trust in procedures 
and institutions that privilege experts and expert opin-
ions, an acceptance and trust that is intimately linked 
to modern society’s functional expert dependency or 
the fact of expertise (Kitcher, 2011): It is impossible—
and most people recognize that it is impossible—to 
make rational political decisions in complex societies 
like ours without relying extensively on expert advice 
and even expert decisions. 
At the same time, the authority of professionals, 
scientists and science and the powers of the “unelect-
ed” appears as more contested. Professional elite mo-
nopolies in the governance of societal sectors have 
been under attack from an increasingly informed public 
in the age of mass higher education and easy access to 
information. In public sector reform the rule/role of 
professionals in welfare state governance and public 
bureaucracies has been challenged, and professions 
are perceived as self-serving “villains” producing public 
sector inefficiencies (Sehested, 2002). In political deci-
sion-making the distinction between beliefs based on 
normative views and technical knowledge are contest-
ed and blurred; is- and ought-questions, facts and val-
ues, descriptions and prescriptions are often inter-
twined, the argument goes. Specialized knowledge is 
enlisted in the service of special interests or mustered 
as political ammunition in adversary decision-making. 
Both elements of “scientization” of politics and “politi-
cization” knowledge can be observed (Boswell, 2008; 
Ezrahi, 1990; Fischer, 2009; Jasanoff, 1990; Marcussen, 
2006; Schofer & Meyer, 2005; Weingart, 1999).  
In the debate on the legitimacy of political orders, 
the tension and dependencies between “politics and 
expertise” has been seen as primarily relevant for in-
ter-institutional relationships between majoritarian in-
stitutions representing the will of the people and non-
majoritarian public administration. Yet, the role of ex-
pertise is inherent in most institutions in a modern po-
litical order and more complex than a simple dyadic re-
lationship between the elected and the unelected 
could lead us to believe. In the judiciary, legal profes-
sional standards and expertise are at the base of a 
well-functioning system and expert testimony is a rec-
ognized and integral part of it (Jasanoff, 1997). In legis-
lative politics the elected remain “amateurs” with no 
special claims on specialized knowledge. However, the 
specialization of parliamentarians’ work within sec-
torally specified committees, an increase in parliament 
staff resources, the use of public hearings, lobbyists 
and interest groups providing expert information, and 
interrogating professional news media speaking “truth 
to power” can be seen as signs of an increasing influx 
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of specialized expertise and “expertification” processes 
also within the legislative branch, in civil society and 
the public sphere, and the development of procedures 
and mechanisms to hold officials, professionals and dif-
ferent groups of experts to account (Blichner, 2015 
(this issue); Bovens, 2007; Campbell & Laporte, 1981; 
Egeberg, Gornitzka, & Trondal, 2014b; Fleischer, 2009). 
Consequently, framing the role of expertise in a politi-
cal system as a pure antagonism versus the democrati-
cally elected, accountable political institution and (run-
away) technocracy or “epistocracy” (Estlund, 2008), 
misses some of the core dynamics on the role of exper-
tise and the normative complexity involved: 
Knowledge-based decision-making and power to ex-
pertise are not something one can be “for” or “against” 
per se, but rather something that is more or less legit-
imate or illegitimate depending on the more specific 
organization and behaviour of actors. This must also be 
the approach to the study and assessments of EU de-
velopments: the expansion of EU competencies has 
prompted a need for expertise in new areas and a spe-
cialization of policy-making in both the executive and 
the legislative branches, which has allowed for stronger 
every day interaction between different institutions 
around specialised policy issues (Egeberg, Gornitzka, & 
Trondal, 2014a). On the other hand, this self-same ex-
pansion challenges existing systems and notions of 
democratic accountability and legitimacy. If anything, 
this calls for systematic investigations and analyses of 
how more exactly expertise is organized, institutional-
ized and held to account within this political order, and 
the implications of concrete interventions, develop-
ments and institutionalization patterns.  
3. Institutionalizing the Expertise-Executive Nexus 
For the executive branch of government there are sev-
eral ways in which expertise can be organized into poli-
cy-making. This universe of organizational ways and 
models has been mapped and analysed in research. 
Our special issue contributes to this ongoing academic 
endeavour, but variations in organizational forms and 
institutionalization are also something executive organ-
izations themselves are aware of, reflect on, and con-
tribute to consolidate or transform, see for example 
Holst and Moodie (2015 (this issue)), analysing the 
Commission’s public communication on its use of ex-
pertise and expertise organization. Generally, expertise 
arrangements vary in location (expertise located both 
within and outside the central government apparatus), 
in permanence (ad-hoc temporary versus permanent 
arrangements), in how rule-governed they are (formal 
or informal), and in how closely connected they are to 
the political centre of executive institutions. Most po-
litical-administrative systems will draw on a combina-
tion of ways of organizing expert advice (Craft & How-
lett, 2013). Executive organizations’ staff represent 
considerable in-house expertise and the backbone of 
professional bureaucracies. Firstly, the degree of pro-
fessionalization of bureaucracy is an indicator of execu-
tive capacity (Fukuyama, 2013). Principles and practic-
es of meritocratic recruitment to administrative bodies 
and the weight given to what types of formal profes-
sional qualifications are in themselves central in defin-
ing the expert-executive nexus. Specialized and exclu-
sive skills are at the root of the power of professions in 
bureaucracies and in societies at large (Christensen, 
2015 (this issue)). Consequently, in order to know the 
role of expertise in an executive order we have to ex-
amine the extent to which bureaucrats are recruited 
and promoted on the basis of merit and what kind and 
level of technical expertise they are required to possess 
(Fukuyama, 2013, p. 352). As a result, changing re-
cruitment policies and practices, such as recruiting on 
the basis of specialist rather than generalist qualifica-
tions in the Commission (Ban, 2010; Christensen, 
2014), might both reflect and contribute to changing 
dynamics in EU policy-making and “technocracy”. An-
other example is how the Commission balances meri-
tocratic recruitment and the need for specialization 
and particular professional competences with other 
concerns, including the bureaucracy’s claim to be de-
mographically “representative” (Trondal, Murdoch, & 
Geys, 2015 (this issue)). 
Secondly, not only the type of in-house expertise 
and professional capacity is important for the exper-
tise-executive nexus; so are the other organisational 
properties of bureaucracies. As participation in policy-
making is defined by the formal position/offices in the 
organizational structure that draws up the defined 
sphere of competence (vertical and horizontal speciali-
zation) in line with Weberian bureaucracy as an ideal 
type (Weber, 1971), we can expect that expertise 
structures follow organisational specialisation. Bound-
ed rationality of decision-makers in an organization 
means that the attention of policy makers is limited 
and bureaucrats’ search for information trails organiza-
tional structures. Hence, contact patterns can be ex-
pected to follow bureaucratic departmental bounda-
ries and hierarchical structures of an organization will 
channel the exchange and processing of information 
and use of expertise (Egeberg, 2012). Main information 
and decision-making premises come from the political 
and administrative leadership and from in-house ex-
pertise found within departments and agencies estab-
lished under a unit’s aegis.  
When the use of expertise follows intra-mural or-
ganizational boundaries, it also becomes relevant to 
see whether capacity is organized in specialized adviso-
ry positions (permanent and temporary) or advisory 
units within the organization, i.e. officers or subunits 
that are expected to be especially oriented towards an 
expert role with full-time permanent staff that are spe-
cialized in producing professional advice, information, 
 Politics and Governance, 2015, Volume 3, Issue 1, Pages 1-12 4 
and knowledge. In the case of the Commission, the es-
tablishment of the Joint Research Centre has created 
specialized capacity for providing policy-relevant scien-
tific input to European policy-making. The capacity for 
expert policy advice has also been housed in “internal 
think tanks” such as the Bureau of European Policy Ad-
visers that, under the Barroso Commission, reported 
directly to the Commission President and operated un-
der his authority. Such positions and units can also be 
reserved for particular professions, organizationally 
anchoring the role of specialised professional skills. Jo-
han Christensen (2015 (this issue)) finds however that 
both recruitment and organizational structures of the 
Commission tend to emphasise specialization less than 
previously assumed. For example, even if there are gen-
erally more economists staffed, and so a quantitative in-
crease, this does not necessarily imply “strong expert 
roles” for economists in a situation where the staff hired 
through economics competitions has dropped, and 
there are few separate units for economic analyses. 
Moreover, a second important dimension in the or-
ganization of in-house expertise is the extent to which 
a vertical specialization has taken place, establishing 
specialized/regulatory agencies that are vertically sepa-
rated from ministry departments and hence at arm’s 
length from direct political steering. If organization 
matters, then “agencification” will tend to secure that 
independent expert considerations are funnelled into 
the policy process (Egeberg & Trondal, 2009). Studies 
of the growing addition of European level agencies 
point to how vertical specialisation has implications for 
what we have labelled the backbone of bureaucracies, 
i.e. its staff qualifications and expertise. Studies show 
that in agencies recruitment and selection of staff is 
based on specific scientific or technical knowledge: 
whereas staff in the Commission tend more to be gen-
eralist—and even more generalist than commonly as-
sumed—staff in European agencies are largely made 
up of specialists, with professional qualifications match-
ing the specialisation of the Agency, such as scientists 
specialised in medicine, veterinary science and subare-
as of engineering (Suvarierol, Busuioc, & Groenleer, 
2013). Agency staff have been shown to lean towards 
having technocratic attitudes supporting the idea that 
legitimacy and accountability of EU agencies builds on 
expertise and should be based on professional stand-
ards, as well as on public approval of their work (Won-
ka & Rittberger, 2011). Christoph Ossege’s study of 
three European agencies (Ossege, 2015 (this issue)), 
shows how the expertise that regulatory agencies such 
as the European Medicines Agency (EMA), the European 
Chemicals Agency (ECHA) and the European Food Safety 
Authority (EFSA) draw on is a sufficient condition for pol-
icy autonomy from the Commission when providing ad-
vice. Due to the multilevel character of the EU’s execu-
tive order and an increased leverage for “agents” 
spurred by a situation of multiple “principals”, the rela-
tionship between expertise and agencies’ policy auton-
omy may even be stronger in the EU context than in 
comparable cases in member states or in more stringent 
federal systems such as the US (Zito, 2015 (this issue)).  
The extramural model for bringing expert advice in-
to policy-making also comes in several versions, be it 
directly through government funded research pro-
grammes, government-supported policy research cen-
tres/think-tanks, ad-hoc purchase of consultancy ser-
vices or research projects, conferences, or indirectly via 
media, or expertise brought in through lobbying. For a 
supranational executive, “externalization” of expertise 
implies relying to a large extent on national knowledge 
and expertise systems and in particular the expertise 
housed in national administrations. Several of the con-
tributions to this issue point to the importance and im-
plications of experts from national administrations in 
several stages of the policy process. Jarle Trondal et al. 
(2015 (this issue)) analyse the Commission’s use of a 
set of so-called seconded national experts (SNE), typi-
cally national civil servants bringing in knowledge of 
their issue area to the Commission, while at the same 
time communicating back their experiences and 
knowledge from EU executive levels to the member 
states. This kind of personnel is on the one hand exter-
nal in the sense that they are recruited on a temporary 
basis from member states’ administrations in areas 
where expertise may be lacking within the Commis-
sion’s permanent staff. On the other hand they are in-
ternal to the supranational executive as they are full-
time staff of the Commission department and their de 
facto role conceptions as experts are significantly 
shaped by their supranational organizational affiliation 
and socialization, as well as their educational back-
ground (Trondal et al., 2015 (this issue)). Nationality 
and other demographic variables cannot explain how 
strongly such personnel are oriented towards an expert 
role when working for the Commission.  
Expert committees are key instruments of modern 
governance and a paramount organized mode for 
channelling external input to executives at national, 
sub-national and supranational levels (Balla & Wright, 
2001; Craft & Howlett, 2013; Krick, 2014), and a promi-
nent way of organizing expertise for the executive also 
in the EU. Committees as collegial bodies vary in their 
mandate, permanence and composition, and whether 
they are expected to make formal and binding deci-
sions or produce advice. Yet their implications for the 
expert-executive nexus are considerable. This is partic-
ularly visible in the everyday policy-making that takes 
place within the elaborate system of expert groups 
that the Commission organizes (Gornitzka & Sverdrup, 
2008; Hartlapp, Metz, & Rauh, 2014; Metz, 2013). 
Within the overall institutional architecture and set of 
formal decision-making rules of the EU there is a con-
siderable diversity in modes of policy making in how 
the everyday policies are shaped and implemented. 
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Member states’ government and administrative bodies 
are coupled to each other and with the Commission in 
expert groups, but such committees are also important 
venues through which a range of other external actors 
accesses the EU policy-making process (Gornitzka & 
Sverdrup, 2015 (this issue); Holst & Moodie, 2015 (this 
issue)). As is the case with national governments, advi-
sory committees can be a way to address the dual chal-
lenge of securing technical expertise for policy making 
as well as responding to demands for representation of 
interests and for accountability (Krick, 2014). In the EU 
expert groups system, this is an “everyday” micro-
cosmos of policy making. However, the shape and role 
of this part of the policy-making system varies consid-
erably in different policy areas (Gornitzka & Sverdrup, 
2011, pp. 52-54) and issue areas. Moreover, the use of 
expert groups is multi-modal and extends beyond the 
technocratic acquisition of advice (Metz, 2013). Bart van 
Ballaert (2015 (this issue)) shows that the Commission 
uses expert groups in around 1/3 of its policy initiatives 
and then primarily as an instrument to reduce uncer-
tainty and not as a means to offset the salience of issues. 
For issues that cut across policy areas and that involve 
standard-setting, the lead DG is likely to make use of the 
expert group system. Saliency as an issue characteristic 
does not seem to have such an effect; there is little evi-
dence that the DGs consult outside experts, from mem-
ber states, science or interests groups—in the “narrow” 
space of committees and groups—in order to build con-
sensus in contentious matters.  
Also, within European agencies much of the actual 
work is done by external experts and scientists via 
committees and expert panels established as part of 
the formal structures of an agency. Suvarierol et al. 
(2013, pp. 920-921) point to how national experts par-
ticipating in these committees and panels are drawn 
from national expert-based administrations. Their role 
conceptions are heavily tilted towards expertise and 
decisions in these fora are based on professional rules, 
criteria and standards rather than national interests or 
supranational norms. In this case “working for Europe” 
means basing decisions and recommendations on sci-
entific reasoning and technical arguments. In fact, na-
tional experts taking part in the committees and panels 
of European agencies may come from the national level 
with double institutional affiliations, i.e. both national 
agencies and university/research institute positions. 
Contributions to this volume elaborate complexities in 
this type of nexus between experts and executives, for 
example in a case where national and EU agency exper-
tise are competing and contestations are enmeshed in 
conflicting interests and competing ideas. Klika’s analy-
sis of the implementation of the REACH directive shows 
how the organized involvement of member states 
regulatory agencies in authorization procedures is not 
only based on expert assessments, but includes politi-
cal considerations in the sense that national interests 
are explicitly represented in committee deliberations 
(Klika, 2015 (this issue)). However, in the end the re-
sponsible agency (in this case, the European Chemicals 
Agency) does not falter faced with opposition from na-
tional capitals when making its recommendations.  
External experts and advisors may also be coupled 
to policy-making through informal structures and net-
works. This implies that shared norms and ideas forge 
the base upon which executive and external experts re-
late with each other in the policy process. From a cul-
tural perspective, cultures and norms of appropriate 
behaviour may be as salient in shaping expert-
executive relationships as formal organisational ar-
rangements. In knowledge utilisation research, such 
cultural explanations have been a starting point in ac-
counting for “gaps” between expertise and executives 
(Caplan, 1979; see also Holst & Moodie, 2015 (this is-
sue); Rimkuté, 2015 (this issue)). Some types of infor-
mation behaviour and contact patterns become institu-
tionalized as “good administrative behaviour” and 
“infused with meaning” beyond the task of instrumen-
tally seeking expert advice to policy briefs or substanti-
ating mobilizing expert support for controversial pro-
posals (see also Holst & Moodie, 2015 (this issue), on 
the logic of “institutional decoupling"). Executive bu-
reaucracies can thus develop departmental cultures 
that are conductive to epistemic orientation in policy 
making and shape their interaction with external ex-
pertise (see also Gornitzka & Sverdrup, 2015 (this is-
sue)). As a result, policy communities can be formed 
around individual DGs and agencies (Coen, 2007). Such 
communities involve a limited number of participants 
that share similar ideologies and values and engage in 
frequent and high quality interaction to an extent that 
they may even be referred to as “epistemic communi-
ties” (Cross, 2015 (this issue)). 
For understanding the expert-executive nexus, an 
important line of investigation is to see how formal or-
ganisational arrangements interact with informal 
norms, traditions and ideas about expertise. Long en-
gagement in expert venues can turn into sites for so-
cialisation into common European expert cultures 
speaking the same expert language, merging agency 
staff and external experts (Suvarierol et al., 2013; see 
also Trondal et al., 2015 (this issue) on “resocialization” 
and self-perception of seconded national experts). 
Moreover, the role that experts can play in policy mak-
ing via epistemic communities is conditional. As under-
lined by Mai’a Cross (2015 (this issue)), research on Eu-
ropean integration can, on the one hand, demonstrate 
that the configuration of a supranational institutional 
set-up, shared values, and transnational interactions in 
Europe has been conductive to the establishment of in-
fluential knowledge-based networks of actors. In such 
cases, networks of experts that share specific profes-
sional behavioural rules and references—based inside 
or outside formal organizations—can exercise collec-
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tive agency beyond the formal mandate of their organ-
ization and be able to persuade others of policy initia-
tives that were not previously on the table. On the 
other hand, Cross’ case study of EU security agencies 
importantly identifies the limits of expertise in influ-
encing the trajectory of integration. She argues that 
the type of institutional context and type of profes-
sional background affects the propensity of networks 
of experts to form epistemic communities. Based on 
the analysis of the European Defence Agency and the 
EU Intelligence Analysis Centre two factors stand out in 
particular as limiting the possibility of forming epistem-
ic communities: the strongly hierarchical bureaucratic 
structure within which experts work and the character-
istics of their professions (secretive and prone not to 
sharing information with each other).  
4. What Type of Expertise for What Type of Executive? 
A Sketch of Ideal Type Models  
These different characteristics and dimensions of the 
expertise-executive nexus can be systematized into a 
set of ideal type patterns or even models that several 
of this special issue’s contributions shed light on.  
Firstly, we could talk of a supranational expertise 
model where policy-making takes place mainly within 
the executive institution itself. Here, attention is drawn 
to the type of expertise that the Commission and other 
executive bureaucracies within the EU hold and how 
that affects policy processes and implementation in the 
EU. Particularly important is how Commission’ depart-
ments relate to the parallel or complementary exper-
tise of EU agencies. This model assumes that participa-
tion in policy-making is reserved primarily for the 
supranational executive body itself, and in particular 
the Commission, as the executive centre, seeks to as-
sert its autonomy, especially from the member states 
but also from other external actors. In-house profes-
sional capacity and meritocracy becomes the basis for 
autonomy of action for the executive and the platform 
for its impact on decision-making at the EU level and in 
inter-institutional relationships, and in the implemen-
tation of policy within the member states. Parallel to 
the observation of bureaucracies of national political 
systems, the Commission’s main source of information 
will be its own staff and subordinate bodies, especially 
agencies to the extent the Commission serves as their 
authoritative principal. A striking example of something 
like this model arguably at work is a case this issue pre-
sents on the Commission's influence in an area where 
it interestingly does not hold formal competences. Ma-
rianne Riddervold and Hsuan Chou (2015 (this issue)) 
argue that the de facto influence of the Commission in 
the formally intergovernmental decision-making of se-
curity and defense policies and external migration is 
anyway substantive and captured by its use of exper-
tise. They find that the Commission used its expert ar-
guments in order to influence the member states and 
other actors' positions by linking intergovernmental 
discussions to policy areas where it holds (cross secto-
rial) expert authority, but also by presenting convincing 
expertise-based arguments. There are, however, limits 
to supranational expertise even in this case, since ex-
pertise as the basis for influence is used next to both 
institutional circumvention through informal consulta-
tions and strategic alliances with members states that 
share the Commission's preference for integration. An-
other relevant example from this special issue is analy-
sis of how the Commission responds to criticism in its 
public communication on the role and use of expertise in 
EU policy-making. Despite a declared openness to 
“knowledge plurality”, the Commission goes a long way 
in problematizing and criticizing external critics’ de-
mands for “democratizing expertise” and more inclusive 
expert arrangements (Holst & Moodie, 2015 (this issue)).  
Secondly, a multi-level administrative model could 
occur, where the Commission and EU agencies involve 
national ministries and other national administrative 
bodies in policy making through formal and informal 
linkages. In this model participation in policy making 
remains within the executive domain, but it incorpo-
rates the idea that bureaucracies are open systems 
that interact with their administrative counterparts 
from other levels of government in a multi-level execu-
tive system. The EU has taken on main hallmarks of 
such an executive model with frequent interpenetra-
tions of national and European level administrations 
(Trondal, 2010). This multi-level administrative policy-
making has two possible interpretations. It has on the 
one hand been argued that member states’ administra-
tions in this model capture the policy process that 
takes place within the European executives, not least 
due to the latter’s dependence on a significant amount 
of national level expertise. This will give member states 
an opportunity to put their mark on policy formation 
and implementation beyond the institutional settings 
where they are formally expected to exert influence 
over policy decisions, that is, primarily in the Council's 
decision-making and in the comitology committees, 
where member states oversee the implementation of 
policy. This interpretation emphasises the interest and 
ability of national governments to influence, monitor, 
and control policy-making within the Commission.  
The contention that the Commission is leaking 
power to national capitals in this way is at odds with 
the growing evidence in support of an alternative in-
terpretation (Egeberg, 2014; Egeberg & Trondal, 2011): 
This model of policy-making in the EU is an indication 
of a system with high level of administrative co-
operation and integration and where national and EU-
level administrative bodies jointly make up an execu-
tive order. The Commission is then seen as inviting na-
tional administrations into the policy-making process in 
order to increase information as well as to promote 
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administrative integration and interaction. For exam-
ple, Trondal et al. (2015 (this issue)) can be read along 
these lines. Their findings on the orientation of nation-
al seconded experts in the Commission do not support 
the idea of national capture. Moreover, the high de-
gree of involvement of national officials in expert 
committees and networks can been seen as a model 
for the Commission to develop a structured and orga-
nized connection with national officials, thereby also 
perforating national administrations. Studies of Com-
mission expert groups find that these are not venues 
where policy making primarily takes place in an inter-
governmental mode. This is an organized context that 
evokes multiple and multifaceted roles for national of-
ficials (Egeberg, Schaefer, & Trondal, 2003), that is, 
they show mixed behavioural patterns that are not 
consistent with the idea that the Commission becomes 
captured by member states via this mode of policy-
making. Information is shared and interpreted in orga-
nized interactions among national and Commission of-
ficials. This affects the identification of a common set 
of beliefs across administrative levels about the main 
problems and the causal mechanisms at work in a poli-
cy area (Radaelli, 2003). It implies that the Commission 
can draw on the national policy expertise as well as in-
formally “sound out” the potential reception of policy 
proposals in national administrations. Also van Bal-
laert’s (2015 (this issue)) findings with respect to the 
Commission’s actual use of expert groups (to reduce 
uncertainty) go against the idea the expert group sys-
tem represents a “nationalization” of the EU executive. 
Thirdly, there is the science-oriented model, where 
researchers and independent scholarly experts are 
brought directly into the policy process; through com-
mittees, or special positions attached to different levels 
of the supranational executive. Here the underlying ra-
tionale is that a bureaucracy is organized to house and 
foster specialized expertise. However, bureaucratic or-
ganizations have limited resources as repositories of 
knowledge, and for gathering and processing scientific 
information by themselves. Thus, they are expected to 
link to external scientific expertise. From such a per-
spective, the autonomy and influence of an administra-
tion is connected to its ability to present itself as neu-
tral, and to ground its actions in updated and 
specialized knowledge. The administration is seen as 
deriving its legitimacy from principles of enlightened, 
knowledge-based government, and both in-house and 
external experts are judged primarily on the basis of 
their epistemic performance (Holst & Moodie, 2015 
(this issue); Olsen, 2008). This is the case in national 
administrations—both national ministries and national 
agencies. The latter institutions in particular are orga-
nized at arm’s length from a direct political steer, and 
have developed strong connections to parallel scientific 
communities and research institutions (Gornitzka, 
2003). At the level beyond the nation state, interna-
tional organizations in general often establish formal 
and informal channels for scientific input to the policy 
process (Andresen, 2000; Haas, Williams, & Babai, 
1977). Scientific expertise has the added attraction as a 
source of information because it may transcend the bi-
as of information imbued with national interests. This 
latter aspect would also apply to EU executive institu-
tions. In the EU, increased complexity and “technical” 
uncertainty in governing modern societies have in-
creased the role of scientific arguments and the role of 
expertise (Ballaert, 2015 (this issue); Radaelli, 1999). 
The nexus between the European executive and scien-
tists underlines the European administrative system as 
an epistemic, scientized space. Drawing on scientists as 
the main information providers would thus legitimize 
the executive bodies’ autonomous basis for action, in-
dependent of national, societal, and partisan interest, 
and would potentially buffer it from the political and 
intergovernmental logic of policy making. In an EU ex-
ecutive context, this would seem to apply not least in 
the case of the agencies: The horizontal specialization 
involved in establishing (semi)independent regulatory 
agencies can be expected to affect the organizational 
foothold that science has within an executive order. 
That is, given that the agency level has in many cases 
the formal task of providing science-based advice and 
regulatory decisions, how agencies actually use scien-
tific expertise is consequently a key to understanding 
the science-oriented expert executive nexus. Several of 
the cases discussed in this issue also point to how the 
presence of agencies at the European level have impli-
cations for how science is funneled into decision-
making and the implications of this not least for agen-
cy-Commission interactions. As argued, for instance, in 
the case of ECHA, EMA and EFSA (Ossege, 2015 (this is-
sue)), the scientific expertise that these agencies draw 
on is the basis for their ability to maintain an inde-
pendent advisory role vis-à-vis the Commission. 
A further step towards uncovering the mechanisms 
involved in the use of scientific expertise is provided by 
Rimkuté (2015 (this issue)). She analyses how a Euro-
pean agency’s (European Food Safety Authority) use of 
scientific expertise is affected by pressures from its ex-
ternal environment and the agency’s internal expert 
capacity. She finds that in the case of pesticide regula-
tion where the Agency had strong internal capacity to 
produce scientific advice (the EFSA’s Pesticide Unit), 
but was faced with controversy among political actors 
and differing scientific conclusions, the Agency used 
scientific evidence in a “strategic substantiating mode”. 
The Commission’s position as risk regulator and as the 
most important actor in EFSA’s environment defined 
new and stricter standards of risk assessment (precau-
tionary principle) which in turn led the agency to rely 
on one type of scientific evidence over another. On a 
general level, this demonstrates that the use of scien-
tific expertise has to be theorized and analyzed by tak-
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ing into consideration internal organizational factors as 
well as environmental and case specific conditions.  
However, there are also limits to scientizaton: Ex-
pert dependence that several of the cases analyzed in 
this special issue refer to does not necessarily lead to 
scientific expertise trumping other decision making 
premises in inter-institutional decision making at the 
supranational level. The Commission’s proposal for 
regulating trade on Seal products is illustrative (Blich-
ner, 2015 (this issue)): The proposal was based on in-
ternal and external scientific assessments but was chal-
lenged by the European Parliament and pressure 
groups on ethical grounds/and with reference to as-
sessment of science from a perspective of animal wel-
fare. This indicates that scientization of policy making is 
conditional—depending on the types of policies or is-
sues, what level of specialized expertise they are seen 
to demand, epistemic uncertainty as well as on degree 
of politicization.  
Finally, there is the “society” model that assumes a 
direct relationship between societal actors and public 
administration, tight links between supranational ex-
ecutive bureaucracies, societal, non-governmental ac-
tors, including consultations with private corporations 
and businesses, EU social partners, and civil society as-
sociations. A pluralist idea suggests that societal inter-
ests and affected parties have a legitimate right to be 
heard and have their views taken into consideration. 
The authority and legitimacy of executive bodies are 
derived from opening up to, channelling, and mediat-
ing different political forces, that is, it reflects defer-
ence to principles of input legitimacy, representation of 
societal interests, and attention to experience-based 
expertise. Administrators need information and sup-
port from such groups for making and defending their 
policies in their relationships with other political insti-
tutions; and such groups can use these organized links 
to further their interests and perspectives on policy is-
sues (Peters, 1995, p. 181). As is the case in national 
administrations, the Commission will be interested in 
cultivating a relationship with business groups and or-
ganized interests as providers of information about 
grass-root preferences and of factual information in 
complex policy areas (Bouwen, 2004; Broscheid & Co-
en, 2007; Coen, 2007). Societal groups make claims to 
represent specialized and professional information as 
well as experiential expertise (Greenwood, 2007).  
Several studies report a triangular relationship be-
tween expertise, executives and society at several lev-
els and stages of the policy processes. The role of ad-
hoc expert venues is a case at hand. Commission ex-
pert groups bring national officials from corresponding 
ministries and agencies into interaction with Commis-
sion departments. As highlighted earlier, the externali-
zation of expertise that takes place within the expert 
groups are in this way embedded in a multi-level ad-
ministrative system (Gornitzka & Sverdrup, 2015 (this 
issue)). However, as societal actors take part in 40 per-
cent of all expert groups the overall pattern of partici-
pation in expert venue is consistent also with the 
Commission as a societal responsive executive that 
bring into policy making a mix of different types of ac-
tors. “Pure” society oriented expert groups are indeed 
rare, but societal representation from industry, “social 
partners” or NGOs are frequently blended with partici-
pation from scientists and academics. Also the factors 
that prompt Commission departments to include “so-
ciety” differ between types of societal actors: the logic 
of inclusion of industry and corporate actors into ex-
pert venues is different from the logic applied to, for 
instance, NGOs. Overall these findings suggest consid-
erable heterogeneity in the European executive’s link 
to external expertise in the preparatory and imple-
menting stages of the policy process. Also the role of 
expertise plays out differently for European agencies 
when they deal with private stakeholders than with 
their Commission parent or partner departments. Vis-
à-vis the latter, the European Medicine Agency, Euro-
pean Chemicals Agency and the European Food Safety 
Authority’s superior specialized expertise guards their 
policy autonomy, whereas with strong private stake-
holder with considerable technical and scientific capac-
ity of their own, agencies engage in procedural insula-
tion in order to protect their independence (Ossege 
2015 (this issue)).  
5. Assessing Expertise in Executives: Normative 
Justification and Institutional Variation 
Finally, there is the question of how to assess the nor-
mative legitimacy of EU expertise arrangements, and—
key for this special issue—how this question of the le-
gitimate, or illegitimate, use and role of expertise and 
experts in policy-making is linked to different dimen-
sions of the organization and institutionalization of the 
expertise-executive nexus. Generally, questions of 
normative legitimacy and justification depend decisive-
ly on choice of justification criteria. Holst and Tørnblad 
(2015 (this issue)) introduce a distinction between in-
trinsic and epistemic justifications of democratic sys-
tems (Estlund, 2008; Goodin, 2003; Lafont, 2006; Peter, 
2011): To be a desirable form of rule, democracy must 
have procedures with “truth-tracking” or “truth-
sensitive” qualities that contribute to improving on de-
cisions, but a normative defense of democracy must al-
so refer to the intrinsic moral value of democratic pro-
cedures. It follows from this that the organization and 
institutionalization of expert arrangements within such 
systems must both fulfill certain democratic procedural 
requirements and score well on performance parame-
ters. Holst and Tørnblad contribute primarily to the lat-
ter in their discussion of how to assess and measure 
the epistemic quality of EU experts’ deliberations in the 
context of the Commission’s expert group system. 
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Their concern overlaps significantly with Klika’s (2015 
(this issue)), as he discusses the viability of European 
Chemicals Agency consultation and decision proce-
dures in light of deliberative expectations and crite-
ria—what he refers to as “throughput legitimacy”, 
framed as an alternative to standard notions of input 
and output legitimacy. There is a similar focus in the 
work of Blichner (2015 (this issue)), who develops a set 
of tests citizens and their representatives can use to hold 
experts to account under conditions of epistemic asym-
metry (see also Holst & Tørnblad, 2015 (this issue)).  
Blichner’s, Klika’s and Holst and Tørnblad’s contribu-
tions are all illustrative of the intimate interconnections 
between normative assessments and organizational and 
institutional analysis. Blichner operationalizes his list of 
accountability tests in the institutional context of Euro-
pean Parliament-Commission interactions. Klika clari-
fies levels of throughput legitimacy by means of a de-
tailed examination of formal and informal aspects of 
the ECHA, its procedures and the multilevel institution-
al context in which it is embedded; Holst and Tørnblad 
highlight the close relationship between experts’ delib-
erative performance and institutional variables, and 
discusses ways to tackle the issue in empirical research. 
This highlights a common underlying point: In assess-
ments of the normative legitimacy of expert arrange-
ments, a set of organizational and institutional charac-
teristics of the expertise-executive nexus will be relevant 
to look at, and several contributions to this volume bring 
our attention to how and why this is so, raising the issue 
quite explicitly or in more implicit terms.  
First, when evaluating experts’ performance and 
the epistemic merits of particular expertise-based bod-
ies or procedures, what kind of experts and expertise 
that are consulted or delegated power on what kind of 
issues, is of significant importance. This is a key norma-
tive subtext in Christensen’s (2015 (this issue)) contri-
bution. If generalists are what the Commission needs 
to perform its task in an optimal way, recruitment of 
generalists are in full order. However, if the Commis-
sion’s staff is also supposed to perform specialized, 
technical tasks that needs highly skilled specialists 
ready to fill “strong expert roles”, current recruitment 
practices are more problematic.  
Secondly, there is the separate question of which 
issues experts of whatever kind should be given extra 
political power on, whether they are consulted, for ex-
ample as part of expert groups or committees, or 
whether they are delegated discretionary space to 
make decisions and formulate and implement policies, 
for example as part of the in-house expertise of an ex-
ecutive agency. A central, but far from clear-cut dis-
tinction runs between technical questions, questions of 
state of affairs, causal dynamics, and “what works”, 
and standard-setting questions of how to conceptual-
ize, rank and interpret principles, values and goals; be-
tween instrumental means-end issues and the moral 
and political issue of which ends we ought to pursue, 
and how we can do so in normatively defensible ways. 
A standard assumption in democratic theory is that the 
latter are questions for citizens, not for experts, for in-
trinsic democratic reasons, and because there cannot 
be “moral experts” (Dahl, 1989; Kitcher, 2011), or if 
there can be such a thing (Broome, 2012; Singer, 1972) 
the ones we should have in mind are not necessarily 
the technical “what works” experts. However, closer 
examinations and analyses of the questions experts ac-
tually engage with, also found in the contributions to 
this special issue (see for example Rimkuté, 2015 (this 
issue), van Ballaert, 2015 (this issue), Zito, 2015 (this is-
sue)) give firm evidence that experts are routinely in-
volved in standard-setting practices and enter “the 
kingdom of ends”, be it because they are formally enti-
tled to do so, because they do so informally, with con-
scious intent, or because they consider it “appropri-
ate”, push the limits of their mandates (as full-fledged 
“epistemic communities” typically would tend to do, 
see Cross, 2015 (this issue)), or because facts and val-
ues in many cases are inevitably intertwined. This rais-
es obvious questions of normative legitimacy, and is a 
natural concern also for Blichner (2015 (this issue)) in 
his discussion of expert accountability in the seal ban 
case (see also Holst &Tørnblad, 2005 (this issue)). 
Thirdly, as already suggested, both formal mandate 
and organization and more informal features of the in-
stitutionalization of expert cultures also need to be 
considered for normative reasons. It is arguably prob-
lematic for executives to seek extensive recourse to 
expert authority arguments of the kind Riddervold and 
Chou (2015 (this issue)) outline even within the domain 
of their formal competences, but even more problem-
atic when they do so beyond it. Moodie and Holst 
(2015 (this issue)) highlight how actual Commission 
communication practices of subtly avoiding unpleasant 
facts contradict official statements of openness and 
transparency and cherished ideas of how knowledge 
utilization is to serve problem-solving and enlighten-
ment. A normative analysis of EU executive/citizen re-
lations will be meager if it fails to consider such infor-
mal features of accountability.  
Fourthly, several of the contributors of this special 
issue address or touch upon the democratic merits of 
EU-expert arrangements. This is an underlying norma-
tive concern for Trondal et al. (2015 (this issue)) when 
they discuss the Commission’s use of expertise from a 
representative bureaucracy perspective, as well as for 
Gornitzka and Sverdrup (2015 (this issue)) in their map-
ping and analysis of societal and stakeholder participa-
tion patterns in the Commission’s expert groups system. 
Also Blichner (2015 (this issue)) could exemplify: His ex-
pert accountability tests are developed to ensure a high 
quality of political decisions under conditions of exper-
tise dependence and epistemic asymmetry, but also no 
doubt reflect deeper concerns for democratic equality. 
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